Remarking that, “settling so many vexing controversies with 5-to-4 votes — effectively making Anthony Kennedy the nation’s philosopher king — is an awfully poor way to run a republic.” Ross Douthat takes a dim view of judicial review. Megan McArdle concurs, “…the process by which 7 judges enforced their consciences on the American public was itself borderline illegitimate; it was first, not in their proper job description, and second, a bad way to run a government.” Jeremy Waldron offers “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”, (html, pdf)
In this Essay, I shall argue that judicial review is vulnerable to attack on two fronts. It does not, as is often claimed, provide a way for a society to focus clearly on the real issues at stake when citizens disagree about rights; on the contrary, it distracts them with side-issues about precedent, texts, and interpretation. And it is politically illegitimate, so far as democratic values are concerned: By privileging majority voting among a small number of unelected and unaccountable judges, it disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights.
Waldron offers a particularly nuanced argument, the nearest to drawing me into the orbit of the judicial review skeptics. But ultimately, I disagree with Douthat, McArdle, and Waldron’s critique judicial review. When compared to the legislature, judicial review offers the prospect of durable rights protection, access to minorities, and higher quality decision. This is not to say that judges are perfect, or that judicial review is guaranteed to produce superior outcomes in every instance – on balance, judicial review offers a worthwhile contribution. (I won’t pursue this point much further because it seems like a copout, but I’d observe that the relationship between legislatures and courts in the US (and Europe, given the ECtHR) is a constructive, dialectical one – decisions aren’t final. Courts and legislatures may not be in the directly adversarial relationship constructed in the pro/anti judicial review discussion. Nonetheless, there’re important arguments to tease out that haven’t been represented in the Douthat, McArdle, and Waldron contributions.)
Judicial review does not turn judges into philosopher kings. It does admit a crucial veto point compatible with the principles underlying democracy (e.g. consent of the governed). Courts are situated in an epistemic community, aiming at objectivity, impartiality, and independence; all these elements are important. I say “aiming” intentionally because these need not be reached absolutely perfectly for judicial review to make a worthwhile contribution to the republic. Courts have articulated methods of analysis prior to examining a particular case. Thus courts approach a fact pattern beginning with an interest in considerations of fairness, justice, and liberty – in the US context as expressed in the provisions of the Constitution, in Europe, the ECHR. Therefore judges provide analysis, find facts, and offer reasons, supporting arguments, and evidence as to why their decision makes sense.
What are admissible and inadmissible as reasons and reasoning by judges is worthy of further consideration (here I draw on Stephen Macedo’s discussion of public justification). At their best, reasons may not be self-interested or narrowly interested. Reasons must be general reasons, thus reasons must be extendable to relevantly similar cases. Reasons must be public, thus reasons must be “widely and openly accessible; appeals to inner conviction or faith, special insight, secret information… are ruled out.” Additionally, the overall opinion that contains the reasons must have engaged with objections and alternatives; confronting counterarguments by anticipating objections and addressing them (“the Politics of Justification” p. 281, gated). Subjected to this standard of public justification, I’d say courts fare better than legislatures.
When analyzing the relationship between courts and legislatures and the prospect of allowing elected representatives or courts to decide on the distribution and limits of rights in society I judge the two alternatives according to three criteria; these are, protection, access, and quality of decision. Protection concerns determining where human rights are more likely to be protected and where citizens are likely to have secure, continuous access to the enjoyment of their rights. Access concerns the inclusiveness of the process, specifically examining to what extent minorities’ concerns are taken into consideration when deciding the limits and distribution of rights. The quality of decision metric concerns the kinds of arguments that are admissible in decision-making and the level of impartiality of the authority doing the analysis of the distribution and limits of rights. Overall, I view courts as being embedded in a structure that is more amenable than legislatures in meeting these criteria.
Judicial review’s location in a rich epistemic community offers more protection of rights than elected representatives. Altogether, a peer review type process occurs as a case travels through the court system. Interpretations are subject to analysis in light of the core texts (Bill of Rights, ECHR) as well as what other judicial interpreters have written about a subject. Additionally, the legal academy’s work in law journals and books are also cited in decisions; this material outside precedent is not necessarily cited as singly authoritative. Altogether, preceding decisions and work of the legal academy situates a judge in a richer, more informed context – certainly more than is given credit for in the epithet “philosopher king”.
Courts are members of and participants in a legal epistemic community. The boundaries of this community are to some degree permeable, such that public attitudes and opinions on the subjects reviewed are sometimes admissible (even though preference is given to the texts produced from centers in the community like court opinions and law journals). Thus courts are not wholly undemocratic, but they do retain a critical distance from the froth of democracy.
Relative to the legislatures, judicial review is a more accessible remedy for minorities with concerns about the distribution and limits of rights. In the US context judges are confined to deciding cases and controversies; there is harm that can be prevented or remedied. This avenue for participation is especially attractive for minorities because legislators are not obligated to hear or act upon unpopular positions. The independence of the judiciary also offers an avenue for a particular type of reasoning and analysis to occur.
Certain characteristics of legislatures lead to their producing potentially lower quality decisions regarding the limits and distributions of rights. Legislatures are not independent by design. They are structured to be responsive to public demands. They need not approach a piece of legislation with predetermined, articulated methods of analysis. In addition to concerns about fairness, justice, and liberty, legislators are free to include self-interested reasons like fundraising, logrolling, and short term political gain in their considerations. Legislators participate in credit-claiming and blame shifting, processes whereby they advertise their responsibility or disclaim responsibility for this or that act. Negotiating with extraneous concerns and materials means that a piece of legislation may be influenced by give and take on completely irrelevant materials. The large breadth of activity a legislature concerns itself, including budgets, perks, and patronage all serve to highlight the susceptibility of rights-oriented materials to other, potentially extraneous, concerns. Furthermore, legislatures are free to structure themselves in lines that distort underlying strengths or weaknesses in the electorate. Seniority systems and requiring supermajorities (like the filibuster) further undermine legislatures’ claims to producing high quality decisions. Altogether, the many prisims through which legislation is refracted offer wide latitude for rights mischief. As Bismarck said, “Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made.”
Altogether, when the court system understands itself to be engaged in act of conducting an objective, impartial, and independent review of a case involving the limits and distribution or rights, then judicial review is acting as another layer of rights protection. As an additional veto point for legislative branch actions, judicial review offers the opportunity for filtering out potential intended or unintended biases in legislation when applying general, facially neutral laws to particular circumstances. Judicial review as an avenue of challenge is of special import to minorities; judicial review is more open to minorities than legislatures precisely because it poses the questions: Does the law in question do what it said it would on the package? How does the law in question match up against the system’s precommittments (Regarding precommitments and constitutions, see, for example Cass Sunstein’s “Designing Democracy”,here or here)? Furthermore the absence of logrolling and other potentially corrosive practices in decision-making, allows courts to reach higher quality decisions. Once again, this is not to say that judges are perfect, or that judicial review is guaranteed to produce superior outcomes in every instance. I merely contend that, on balance, judicial review is structured such that it is more likely to provide secure, continuous access to the enjoyment of rights.
Judicial review does not convert judges into philosopher kings. Judges lack the power to initiate. Courts may strike down legislation, judicial review does not turn them into the promulgators of legislation. In line with the principles underlying democracy (e.g. consent of the governed), important agenda setting functions are properly retained by the legislature.
Altogether, I have offered a thick account of courts and what is undertaken in judicial review. My account of legislatures has been thinner than that of Waldron. (I contest Waldron’s assumption about political equality because I find it an area that is problematized amongst elected representatives; even in “advanced” democratic societies issues surrounding the rights of migrant workers, racial minorities, women, etc., remain hotly contested in legislatures. Political equality is not a given.) Lawrence v. Texas, Roper v. Simmons, Brown v. Board, Loving v. Virginia in the United States, Goodwin v. UK in the ECHR – just a few of the cases where judicial review provided a crucial push towards greater human dignity. Those making the case against judicial review have a steep hill to climb indeed.
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